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ABSTRACT
Incompatibility in markets with indirect network effects can affect prices if consumers value "mix
and match" combinations of complementary network components. In this paper, we examine the
effects of incompatibility using data from a classic market with indirect network effects: Automated
Teller Machines (ATMs). Our sample covers a period during which higher ATM fees increased
incompatibility between ATM cards (which are bundled with deposit accounts) and other banks'
ATM machines. A series of hedonic regressions suggests that incompatibility strengthens the
relationship between deposit account pricing and own ATMs, and weakens the relationship between
deposit account pricing and competitors' ATMs. The effects of incompatibility are stronger in areas
with high population density, suggesting that high travel costs increase both the strength of network
effects and the importance of incompatibility in ATM markets.
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In order to perform an Automated Teller Machine (ATM) transaction, consumers must employ both
an ATM card and an ATM. In the parlance of the literature on network economics, this creates
an indirect network eﬀect: a feedback eﬀect between complementary components of a system,
through which consumers￿ value of any one component is connected to the availability of another.1
Indirect network eﬀects exist in many markets with emerging technologies; computer hardware
and software, operating systems and spreadsheets, and diﬀerent audio/visual systems are a few
well-known examples. In ATM markets as in some of these other examples, integrated ￿rms sell
both components of the system: ATM cards (via deposit accounts) and ATMs. This creates an
internalized network eﬀect, in which an increase in the availability of a bank￿s own ATMs increases
consumers￿ willingness to pay for deposit accounts. Furthermore, ATM machines can operate on
shared networks, allowing consumers to use their card at an ATM owned either by their own bank
or another bank. This permits consumers to mix and match components sold by diﬀerent ￿rms.
In mix and match markets with indirect network eﬀects, compatibility between components
oﬀered by diﬀerent ￿rms is important. Compatibility allows consumers to construct a wider array
of mix and match goods, increasing their choice sets. In ATM markets, compatibility depends
on whether consumers can use their cards with other banks￿ ATM machines. In its brief history,
the ATM market has exhibited varying degrees of compatibility along this dimension. While at
its inception the market exhibited complete incompatibility because ATMs accepted only ATM
cards issued by their owning bank, over the 1980s compatibility emerged as banks formed shared
networks that allowed customers to use their cards at other banks￿ ￿foreign" ATMs. At that
point, banks￿ network membership determined the degree of compatibility. By the early 1990s, all
banks essentially subscribed to common networks, allowing full compatibility between cards and
competitors￿ ATMs.
In this paper, we examine the empirical eﬀects of a later shift toward incompatibility between
cards and foreign ATMs. In an environment where banks operate on shared networks, incom-
patibility between deposit accounts and competitors￿ ATMs results from banks￿ imposition of fees
associated with foreign transactions. There are two such fees: a foreign fee levied by the customer￿s
home bank and a surcharge imposed by the bank owning the foreign ATM. Both foreign fees and
surcharges create incompatibility, although in slightly diﬀerent ways. Because customers link their
valuation of deposit accounts to the surcharging behavior of other banks owning ATMs in their
local market, incompatibility of a given bank￿s card with other ATMs depends on its own foreign
fee, and the surcharges imposed by other banks. Following the literature on network economics,
1Economides (1989, 1991) and Matutes and Regibeau (1988, 1992) cite ATMs as an example of a market with
indirect network eﬀects.
2we expect incompatibility to change the relative importance of the complementary components in
the system. Because incompatibility makes competitors￿ ATMs less accessible, it should reduce the
strength of the relationship between them and deposit account pricing. As a consequence, it may
also strengthen the link between own ATM density and deposit account pricing. The extent of
these changes should depend on the degree of incompatibility.
We employ a quasi-natural experiment to identify these eﬀects. Before 1996, the largest shared
networks barred banks from imposing surcharges, while after 1996 they removed the ban and
surcharges became widespread.2 This represents a discrete move toward incompatibility. There
is also a certain amount of variation after 1996 in the degree to which surcharging is adopted.
Some banks adopt surcharging quickly, while others move more slowly. Finally, within the set
of banks that surcharge we observe variation in the level of fees. While we include foreign fees
in the analysis, they change little over our sample period, meaning that the post-1996 advent of
surcharging provides the primary source of identi￿cation in the data.
Our data consist of bank/year observations for a panel of banks competing in local markets
across the United States from 1994-1999. For each bank, we observe its average deposit account
fees, ATM deployment across its markets, and ATM fees. This allows us to identify the own ATM
access granted to consumers by having a deposit account with that bank. We can further distinguish
the in￿uence of available competitors￿ ATMs by constructing a measure of the competitors￿ ATMs
available to that bank￿s customers. We measure incompatibility for each bank using a measure of
the surcharges imposed by competitors in its local markets.
Our empirical approach consists of estimating a set of hedonic regressions linking deposit account
pricing to account characteristics and the availability of ATMs associated with the account. The
hedonic regressions establish that both own and competitors￿ ATMs are positively related to deposit
account prices. We also examine how incompatibility changes the relationships between component
availability and deposit account pricing. Our ￿ndings are broadly consistent with the implications
of theory. We ￿nd that incompatibility reduces the strength of the link between other banks￿
ATM availability and deposit account prices and increases the strength of the link between own
ATM availability and deposit account pricing. Our results are robust to diﬀerent measures of
incompatibility, ATM availability, and deposit account prices.
We also attempt to clarify the appropriate interpretation of our results within the hedonic
framework. It is well known that hedonic regressions should not be strictly interpreted as iden-
tifying utility parameters; rather, they should be viewed as reduced form relationships re￿ecting
2Sixteen states overrode the ban prior to 1996; we account for this in the empirical work below. See Prager (2001)
for an examination of this episode. One state (Iowa) maintained its ban after 1996, but our sample contains no data
from banks in Iowa.
3the in￿uence of other factors such as changes in costs and markups. We therefore present results
from broader speci￿cations of the model that include independent variables capturing demand and
supply eﬀects. Our primary results remain qualitatively similar, suggesting that shifts in observable
s u p p l ya n dd e m a n di n ￿uences are not responsible for our results.
The ￿nal section of the paper attempts to understand how travel costs aﬀect the relative im-
portance of network eﬀects and incompatibility. We ￿nd that network eﬀects and the eﬀects of
incompatibility are much stronger in markets with high population density. Because high pop-
ulation density increases travel costs, we interpret this as consistent with the notion that travel
costs are an important determinant of the relationship between ATM services and deposit account
pricing. Given the weakness of the results in low density markets, however, we also admit the pos-
sibility that our model is well-speci￿ed for high-density markets but poorly speci￿ed for low-density
markets.
These results shed light on an aspect of network eﬀects￿incompatibility￿that previous work
has found diﬃcult to examine empirically. There is a small literature testing for network eﬀects
taking incompatibility as given, generally seeking to establish the existence of network eﬀects.3
Existing work on incompatibility is essentially limited to the study of competition between incom-
patible networks, and has employed fairly limited data on incompatibility.4 Our work bene￿ts from
the ability to observe within-market changes in incompatibility and a measure of incompatibility
that is continuous rather than discrete, although in practice our identi￿cation strategy relies on a
fairly discrete shift toward incompatibility. Our work also adds to the existing empirical literature
examining ATM markets. Much of this literature only indirectly addresses the indirect network
3Examples of work taking incompatibility as given include Gandal, Greenstein and Salant (1999), who study the
link between operating system values and software availability in the early days of the microcomputer market. They
￿nd evidence supporting the existence of indirect network eﬀects. More recent work by Gandal, Kende and Rob
(2002) tests for indirect network eﬀects in the adoption of Compact Disks (CDs) and CD players. Rysman (2000)
provides evidence supporting the existence of complementary demand relationships in a two-sided platform market
(Yellow pages). More recent work by Shankar and Bayus (2002), Nair, Chintagunta and Dube (2003) and Karaca-
Mandic (2003) applies structural econometric techniques to test for the existence of network eﬀects in markets where
compatibility is ￿xed.
4Gandal (1994, 1995) and Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (2001) ￿nd that computer spreadsheets compatible with the
Lotus system commanded higher prices during the early 1990s. Our work diﬀers from this early work, in that it
estimates the eﬀects of compatibility across diﬀerent components of the network. It also diﬀers in that it primarily
relies on within-￿rm and within-market rather than cross-sectional variation in compatibility for identi￿cation. More
precisely, the analyses in Gandal (1994, 1995) and Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (2001) do not separate within-￿rm from
cross-sectional eﬀects of compatibility. The datasets are panels, but too small to allow the examination of within-￿rm
variation. In one other piece of work examining a diﬀerent market, Greenstein (1994) ￿nds that mainframe buyers
prefer to upgrade to compatible systems, a result suggesting that compatibility between past and future hardware is
important.
4eﬀects between ATM cards and machines, although it does in some cases test hypotheses that relate
to network eﬀects.5
2 Deposit Accounts and ATM Services
ATM cards are generally sold as part of the service bundle attached to a consumer￿s deposit account.
The deposit account is a checking account into which the customer deposits funds, and from which
the customer withdraws funds periodically for purchases.6 The standard deposit account agreement
also oﬀers customers free access to the bank￿s own ATMs. ATMs allow bank customers to perform
transactions electronically on their deposit accounts. Banks locate their ATMs ￿on-premise￿ at
bank branches, and also ￿oﬀ-premise￿ at locations such as convenience stores, movie theaters,
bars, and other locations where consumers typically need cash. In addition to deposit account
services, bank oﬀer savings account services and a wide variety of other ￿nancial services such as
loans, brokerage and investment services and insurance. In principle, consumers can purchase these
services from separate banks, and often do.
While banks￿ strategic behavior is not the focus of our analysis here, it is worth highlighting
the most important features of competition between banks. In the United States, approximately
10,000 commercial banks compete for deposit account customers in their local markets.7 Smaller
banks often operate only within a small geographic area such as a county, in many cases using
a single branch. The largest banks conduct operations in many states or even nationally, and
5Hannan et al. (2002) examine banks￿ propensity to impose surcharges as a function of a variety of characteristics,
although they do not explicitly link their analysis to deposit account pricing. Prager (2001) tests whether small banks
lost market share in states that allowed surcharges prior to 1996; this is implicitly a test of whether incompatibility
favored banks with high-quality ATM ￿eets, although she does not pose the question in those terms. Hannan and
McDowell (1984a, 1984b, 1990) explore the relationship between market concentration and ATM adoption. They
￿nd that markets in which large banks adopted ATMs became more concentrated during the 1980s, although they do
not discuss their ￿nding in terms of network economics. Finally, Saloner and Shepard (1995) examine the diﬀusion of
ATMs from 1972-1979 and ￿nd that adoption occurred earliest for ￿rms with many branches and deposits, a result
they interpret as consistent with the existence of indirect network eﬀects in demand. Gowrisankaran and Krainer
(2003) estimate the welfare eﬀects of the increase in ATM deployment stemming from the surcharge ban, although
their model does not incorporate network eﬀects.
6During our sample most ATM cards began serving as debit cards. We do not directly model the link between
these markets, although it appears that they are linked. The advent of surcharging in 1996, for example, appears
to have spurred increased use of debit cards for purchases. Consumers￿ ability to substitute away from ATM use
following the imposition of surcharges would attenuate the link between surcharging and willingness to pay for deposit
accounts. Provided this substitution is not perfect, we would still expect to see an eﬀect of surcharging on willingness
to pay for deposit accounts.
7Our data omit observations for credit unions and thrifts. However, these institutions collectively hold only a
small share of the deposit market.
5can have thousands of branches and ATMs. Markets are typically assumed to exist at the county
level, a convention that we adopt in our analysis in identifying banks￿ competitors.8 There is
considerable heterogeneity in market structure across regions, with rural markets typically being
more concentrated than urban markets. Even within markets, there is considerable variation in
banks￿ ATM strategies￿some banks blanket their markets with ATMs, while others deploy them
sparingly. As we will illustrate below, one of the most systematic diﬀerences across banks regarding
ATMs is that large banks deploy them more aggressively than small banks (relative to maintaining
branches, for example). Another is that ATM deployment is largely concentrated in areas of high
population density. We discuss the implications of this fact in some detail below.
Banks subscribe to ￿shared networks￿ that allow their customers to use other banks￿ ATMs.
In most cases access to these ￿foreign￿ ATMs is incomplete because it only allows consumers to
withdraw cash; more complex transactions such as making deposits are not permitted through the
shared network. The networks themselves are typically joint ventures formed by banks in order
to share the ￿xed costs of interconnection infrastructure. Banks usually pay a ￿xed monthly or
annual membership fee to the network. They also pay a ￿switch fee￿ for each transaction made by
one of their customers on another bank￿s ATMs; the switch fee is roughly $0.40 on average during
our sample, and does not vary signi￿cantly across networks or regions. Part (on the order of $0.10)
of the switch fee is paid as ￿interchange￿ to the network, and the remainder ￿ows to the ATM￿s
owner in order to compensate it for providing services to a non-customer.
Bank customers therefore purchase from their home bank a bundle of services associated with
the deposit account, including both an ATM card and unlimited access to that bank￿s ATMs.
These bundles are diﬀerentiated both horizontally and vertically. Horizontal diﬀerentiation pri-
marily stems from geography; consumers strongly prefer banks with branches and ATMs that are
conveniently located.9 The services other than deposits provided by banks can confer both horizon-
tal and vertical diﬀerentiation. These complementary services include oﬀering savings and money
market accounts, oﬀering loans ranging from mortgages to credit cards, and oﬀering brokerage
services. Large banks are more likely to oﬀer these services, although they become more widely
available at banks of any size over our sample period. Vertical diﬀerentiation also exists across
features of the deposit account; banks vary in quality of customer service, for example. A good
deal of vertical diﬀerentiation stems from ATM availability; banks often use the size of their ATM
8Some work treats multi-county MSAs rather than individual counties as markets in urban areas￿in our case,
d o i n gs om a k e sad i ﬀerence empirically. Recently, the question of whether banking markets have become less local
has come to light (see Radecki [1998] for a discussion). While this may be true for products such as mortgages, it is
unlikely to be true for consumers￿ ATM usage, which is necessarily local.
9See Stavins (1999) for a discussion of the characteristics that consumers favor when making their deposit account
choices.
6￿eet as a key component of their marketing strategy.
For any given deposit account bundle, customers will also base their willingness to pay on the
degree to which they can use other ￿rms￿ ATMs. This depends on both on the availability of those
ATMs in the local market, and on the compatibility between cards and other banks￿ machines.
Incompatibility in turn is a function of the fees imposed by other banks for such use. Because this
relates so closely to the network literature on incompatibility, we now discuss that literature in
order to motivate our empirical work.
3N e t w o r k E ﬀects and Incompatibility
In recent years a wide-ranging theoretical literature has emerged examining the eﬀects of compati-
bility in markets with indirect network eﬀects.10 Indirect network eﬀects are strong complementary
relationships in demand between component products that consumers assemble into systems. In
such settings there is a further distinction between components that are ￿hardware￿ and compo-
nents that are ￿software.￿ In such settings, ￿hardware￿ is the component of the system that is
durable or otherwise incurs greater switching costs. In the case of ATMs, cards are hardware be-
cause they require the purchase of a subscription good￿the deposit account￿that carries switching
costs.
Considering the institutional detail of the ATM market, the most relevant models of competition
in markets with indirect network eﬀects are those in which integrated ￿rms sell both components
of the system.11 The compatibility issue then becomes whether Firm A￿s components will function
with Firm B￿s complementary components, and vice versa. Transactions of this sort, in which
consumers purchase components from diﬀerent ￿rms are known as ￿mix and match￿ transactions.
While much of the theoretical literature considers cases of absolute compatibility or incompatibility,
a related literature examines cases of partial compatibility, where for example consumers can attain
compatibility by paying an ￿adaptor fee￿ enabling them to use otherwise incompatible software.
The intuitions we highlight below are generally robust to whether compatibility is absolute or
adaptor-based.
The most general result of these models is that holding prices constant, incompatibility (weakly)
reduces consumers￿ willingness to pay. The strength of this eﬀect depends on the degree to which
consumers want to ￿mix and match￿ components from diﬀerent sellers. If demand for such trans-
10See Katz and Shapiro (1994) for a review.
11Chou and Shy (1989), Church and Gandal (1992), and Matutes and Regibeau (1989) consider cases where
network components are sold separately. Economides and Salop (1992) provide a comparison of market structures
characterized by diﬀerent forms of integration and ownership among component producers. Matutes and Regibeau
(1992) examine a case where ￿rms produce both components of the network, but may bundle them together.
7actions is zero, incompatibility leaves consumers unchanged, but if demand for mix and match
transactions is high, incompatibility reduces aggregate willingness to pay. These eﬀects may vary
by ￿rm; ￿r m sw i t hh i g hd e m a n df o rm i xa n dm a t c ht r a n s a c t i o n sw i l le x p e r i e n c eal a r g e rr e d u c t i o n
in willingness to pay. In our sample, we would expect this implication to be re￿ected by a fall in
prices as surcharging becomes prevalent, ceteris paribus. Banks with low ATM density are those
whose customers would have the highest demand for ￿mix and match￿ transactions in which they
would use the machine of another bank, implying that banks with low density would experience
the greatest fall in willingness to pay.12
A second result of the network literature is that incompatibility shifts the relative importance
of components, because it moves consumers￿ purchase decisions from the component to the sys-
tem level. With full compatibility, a customer may purchase components separately, but with
incompatibility a customer chooses between bundled systems oﬀered by diﬀerent sellers. In a hard-
ware/software market, moving from component to system purchasing should therefore strengthen
the empirical link between own software availability and hardware prices, and weaken the link
between competitors￿ software availability and prices. In our setting, we can see this intuition by
considering an environment with no ATM fees. In that case customers would attach little or no
v a l u et oas p e c i ￿c bank￿s ATM density. Once incompatibility exists, however, the distribution
of ATM density across banks becomes important and will aﬀect customers￿ absolute and relative
valuations of deposit accounts.
The fact that ATM and banking behavior involves travel is also important. Most models of
ATM/banking competition portray consumers as facing travel costs to use ATMs. This in￿uences,
for example, the marginal decision regarding whether to use a close foreign ATM (which carries
fees) or a more distant own ATM. This implication has a clear analogue in the hardware/software
literature; in most theoretical models of hardware/software pricing, consumers ￿nd software avail-
ability valuable because it reduces the distance (in characteristic space) to their favorite software
variety. While most theoretical models implicitly hold travel costs constant, in general we would
expect that the implications discussed above would be stronger for consumers facing high travel
costs. At zero travel costs, for example, consumers would never use a foreign ATM or pay fees
as long as their home bank had one ATM somewhere. While quantifying travel costs is diﬃcult,
it is widely accepted that areas with high population density have signi￿cantly higher travel costs
than non-dense rural areas. To account for this, in the empirical work below we present results for
subsamples of high and low population density.
12This abstracts from the selection eﬀect that would lead customers with inherently high ￿mix and match￿ demand
to migrate toward banks with large ATM ￿eets. Such a selection bias will reduced the observed diﬀerence between
banks with high and low ATM density.
8There are limitations to our approach. A ￿rst limitation is that it abstracts from the compat-
ibility choice at the ￿rm level. Firms clearly choose the level of incompatibility, meaning that it
is jointly determined with other features of competitive equilibrium. In our case, we can make an
argument that the shift is at least weakly exogenous for two reasons. One reason is that ￿rms were
constrained prior to 1996 by the by-laws of the largest networks from surcharging. The advent
of surcharging therefore represented the removal of a constraint, rather than a purely endogenous
shift in strategic behavior. A second reason for at least weak exogeneity of incompatibility is that
we examine how surcharging by a ￿rm￿s competitors aﬀect its pricing, rather than how its own
surcharging aﬀects its own pricing. Of course, in concentrated local banking markets such decisions
are interrelated, but the relationship is less direct. A second limitation of our partial equilibrium
approach is that it takes ￿rms￿ characteristics as given￿most notably their software quality, as
measured by the size of their ATM ￿eet. There is little question that the advent of surcharging
changed the business model for ATM operations and accelerated the deployment of ATMs; this
will become apparent when we discuss the descriptive statistics below. However, for our purposes
the deployment decision is not the margin of interest. We are interested in measuring how changes
in deployment aﬀect pricing for deposit accounts under both compatibility and incompatibility. In
future work we plan to examine how incompatibility aﬀects the deployment decision, but for now
we leave that issue aside. Another limitation of our work is that while there is surely considerable
consumer-level heterogeneity in willingness to pay, our data do not lend themselves to an examina-
tion of this heterogeneity.13 Our approach is rather to estimate average eﬀects. While this could be
a concern if the distribution of consumers with diﬀerent characteristics changed across ￿rms based
on the shift to incompatibility, we are unable to ￿nd evidence that this happened.14 Finally, our
work does not address the policy and welfare questions associated with incompatibility in general,
and ATM fees in particular. A general result of the theoretical literature on incompatibility is
that markets may display ￿too much￿ incompatibility from a social welfare perspective. In ATM
markets, this argument has been made implicitly (though rarely in the language of the network
economics literature) by those who attack ATM fees as ￿too high.￿ We are exploring this issue in
13We do attempt to handle some heterogeneity in the sample through our analysis of the relationship between
population density and network eﬀects. However, we are unable to incorporate other consumer-level data. For
example, one might imagine that income would aﬀect the importance of network eﬀects. There are no data at the
market level, unfortunately, on income. (The Census publishes county/year level income data, but these are simply
interpolated between the decennial census ￿gures.)
14For example, we know that banks with high deposit balances/account will have lower price measures, because
banks waive explicit deposit fees for customers with high balances. This would be a concern if the shift to surcharging
caused the distribution of balances/account to shift across banks, because it would introduce a spurious correlation
between surcharging and prices. In unreported results, we regress balances/account on our measure of incompatibility
and ￿nd no relationship between them.
9complementary work that uses structural demand models to estimate the consumer welfare eﬀects
of incompatibility.15
4 Hedonic Speci￿cations
A wide literature uses hedonic methods to estimate the relationship between product character-
istics and prices.16 The underlying hypothesis of the method is that products may be viewed as
bundles of characteristics that are valuable to consumers. A hedonic regression attempts to uncover
information about the marginal values of these characteristics to the typical consumer. The typical
hedonic regression regresses price for product i at time t on a set of product characteristics Xit and
(possibly) a set of ￿xed eﬀects (αi,α t):
ln(pit)=Xitβ + αi + αt + εit, (1)
This is also the approach taken in some other studies of compatibility.17 A strict interpretation
of the hedonic speci￿cation is that the β coeﬃcients represent willingness to pay (marginal value)
attached to characteristics, while the αi product dummies represent time-invariant price shifters.
If the β and αi coeﬃcients remain constant over time, one can also interpret the time dummies as
the basis for constructing a price index.18 As a general point (one that is true in any regression),
the β coeﬃcients will be biased by the omission of unobserved characteristics that are correlated
with Xit.
More formally, it has been well documented in recent years that in general the β coeﬃcients will
not re￿ect underlying utility parameters, as is sometimes assumed in hedonic modeling. Rather,
the coeﬃcients should be viewed as coming from a reduced form model capturing a combination of
cost- and demand-based in￿uences on prices, as well as any markups over marginal cost resulting
from product diﬀerentiation or oligopolistic behavior.19 The literature focusing on this issue has
identi￿ed a set of assumptions under which the baseline hedonic regression above provides estimates
of consumer willingness to pay. In particular, under perfect competition with linear or log-linear
marginal costs, a hedonic regression will capture the contribution of each characteristic to marginal
15See Knittel and Stango (2004).
16The pioneering work of Rosen (1974) is often cited as justi￿cation for hedonic models measuring willingness to
pay.
17See, e.g., Gandal (1994).
18See Triplett (1986).
19See Triplett (1986, 1988) for early discussions of this point in the context of the confusion between ￿resource costs￿
and ￿valuation.￿ Pakes (2003) treats the issue more formally by constructing bounds on the relationship between
reduced form coeﬃcients as compensating variation (i.e., willingness to pay).
10cost (and hence marginal value).20 Under imperfect competition the hedonic coeﬃcients will rep-
resent marginal values only if the relationship between characteristics and utility follows particular
functional forms.21 However, it is unlikely that these assumptions hold in our data, for reasons we
discuss below. Therefore, in section 5 below we present a variety of alternatives to the baseline
hedonic model in order to assess the robustness of our results. We also attempt to be circumspect
about interpreting our results as strictly measuring changes in willingness to pay.
R e t u r n i n gt ot h es p e c i ￿cation above, in our case we estimate the relationship between prices
for deposit accounts and characteristics of deposit account bundles. The unit of observation is the
bank/year level. While our price variable is measured at the bank level, we de￿ne the market to be
the county in which a bank operates. To aggregate the county level product characteristics to the
bank/year level, we compute the weighted average of the characteristic over all counties in which
the bank operates (weighted by deposits). Our measure of deposit account prices divides annual





This measure re￿ects the annual price per dollar of deposit account balances.22 The fee income
measure includes revenue from monthly account fees, fees on bounced checks, per-check transaction
charges, extra fees for returned checks, and in rare cases fees for the use of tellers￿ services. It also
includes ￿foreign fee￿ revenue; we discuss the implications of this below. It does not include
income from surcharges, as surcharge revenue is collected from non-customers and therefore falls
into a separate revenue category. Below, we test the robustness of our results to alternative price
measures.
Characteristics include those associated with ATMs and those associated more generally with
deposit accounts. Account characteristics include the number of branches per square mile owned
by the bank in all of its local markets (counties), the number of employees per branch, and the
average salary per employee. The last variable attempts to capture service quality, although it is
also clearly correlated with average costs. To capture the possibility that consumers value obtaining
banking services outside their home county, we also include the number of counties in which the
bank operates. We also observe a number of bank-level characteristics that do not vary over time
(or vary only slightly). These characteristics include whether the bank is a subsidiary of a large
bank holding company, whether the bank oﬀers credit card, money market or brokerage accounts,
20This discussion follows Feenstra (1995).
21See Feenstra (1995) for details. The condition relates to the function describing the ￿durability￿ component
h(Xit) of quality; if this function it homogeneous of degree one in product characteristics, the hedonic regression
captures marginal values even under imperfect competition.
22See the Data Appendix for more detail on the construction of this variable.
11and a dummy variable indicating whether the bank operates in multiple counties. While we can not
include these characteristics in our hedonic regression because we also include bank ￿xed eﬀects, we
use a two-stage procedure to estimate the relationship between these characteristics and prices.23
Appendix B outlines this procedure and presents results, which we summarize below.
ATM characteristics include both the ATMs owned by bank i,a n dt h eA T M so w n e db yi t s
competitors in the local markets in which it competes. Both types of ATMs should increase will-
ingness to pay for the deposit account based on the indirect network eﬀect relating deposit accounts
and ATMs. In the absence of ATM fees (incompatibility), all banks￿ ATMs might be equally valu-
able to consumers, although consumers may prefer their own banks￿ ATMs if they oﬀer greater
functionality (such as deposit-taking).
This implies that in the absence of incompatibility, prices should be related to bank character-
istics, own ATM density and competitors￿ ATM density:
ln(pit)=Xitβ + γ1 ln(OwnDensit)+γ2 ln(CompDensit)+αi + αt + εit. (3)
We measure density as ATMs per square mile over all counties in which the bank operates.
We use logs to re￿ect the fact that each additional machine reduces the expected travel distance
to use an ATM by a successively smaller amount. One issue with this speci￿cation is that we
have only partial data on competitors￿ ATMs. Our data source provides information regarding the
ATM deployment of the largest 300 issuers in the United States; these issuers collectively hold a
signi￿cant majority of all ATMs during our sample period, but not all. In order to deal with this,
we estimate the number of ATMs deployed by each bank￿s competitors for which we do not observe
actual deployment.24 We have used a variety of techniques for this estimation, an issue discussed
in great detail in Knittel and Stango (2004).25 We outline the estimation procedure in Appendix
B, and discuss its implications below.
4.1 Specifying Incompatibility
Incompatibility should change the relative (net) value of own and competitors￿ ATMs. It makes
competitors￿ ATMs relatively less attractive by increasing the explicit costs associated with traveling
23As suggested by Chamberlain (1982), we regress the estimated ￿xed eﬀects from the ￿rst stage on the ￿xed bank
characteristics.
24We do not have data on ATM deployment by Independent Service Operators (ISOs), who began deploying
machines after the advent of surcharging. Aggregate data indicate that by 1999, ISO-deployed ATMs comprised ten
percent of ATMs nationwide. The eﬀect of these ATMs on prices is an omitted variable in our speci￿cations.
25Almost all smaller issuers deploy roughly one ATM per branch, with deployment growing slightly over time.
Aggregate data from the Card Industry Directory con￿rm this; in every year between 1994 and 1999, the roughly
10,000 issuers outside the top 300 deploy a total of 10,000 ATMs.
12to a competitors￿ ATM. It also makes own ATMs more relevant because on the margin, consumers
will likely make more transactions at their bank￿s ATMs. We therefore allow incompatibility to
aﬀect prices by interacting it with ATM density:
ln(pit)=Xitβ + γ1 ln(OwnDensit)+γ2 ln(CompDensit)
+γ3 ln(OwnDensit)Incompatit + γ4 ln(CompDensit)Incompatit + αi + αt + εit.(4)
We measure incompatibility in three ways. First, because the primary change in compatibility
was discrete following elimination of the surcharge ban, we construct a dummy variable equal to
one if the state in which a bank has primary operations allows surcharging.26 This variable is equal
to one for all observations after 1996. The second way we measure incompatibility is by estimating





The average surcharge is weighted, where the weights are the shares of total ATMs held by
other banks in bank i￿s local market(s). The motivation for this speci￿cation is an assumption that
consumers know something about the distribution of ATMs and ATM fees in their local market,
but do not have perfect knowledge regarding either speci￿c fees at each ATM or the locations in
which they will experience an unanticipated need for cash.27 Because we possess surcharge data
for only the largest ATM issuers in each market, constructing this average requires making an
assumption about the surcharging behavior of smaller issuers. We outline these assumptions and
discuss robustness in Appendix A; our results are quite robust to diﬀerent assumptions about the
behavior of smaller issuers.





This measure has the advantage that both foreign fees and surcharges aﬀect the marginal degree
of incompatibility between a card and competitors￿ ATM. However, the price measure includes
foreign fee revenue, so using this measure will bias the coeﬃcient on incompatibility because higher
fees per se lead to higher prices. This limits our ability to interpret these coeﬃcients. In practice,
the results are quite similar using any measure of incompatibility, because nearly all of the variation
in any incompatibility measure stems from the post-1996 regime change in surcharging.
26We de￿ne the state of ￿primary operations￿ as that where the bank holds the greatest dollar value of deposits.
27This is analogous to the modeling assumptions in Massoud and Bernhardt (2002).
13Finally, while the largest networks barred surcharging prior to 1997, a number of states overrode
the bans prior to 1997. While we do not observe the extent of surcharging in these states, we can
identify their eﬀects through a dummy variable AllowSurchit.I ns o m es p e c i ￿cations below we also
include this other measure. This is particularly useful given that most variation in incompatibility
occurs discretely in 1997; the AllowSurchit variable provides a test against the hypothesis that the
value of ATMs changed after 1996 due to some unobserved factor.
4.2 Econometric Issues
While these data are in principle very rich, we do face measurement issues in both our competitors￿
fees and ATMs variables. The presence of measurement error will bring the estimated coeﬃcients
toward zero, biasing against ￿nding an eﬀect of the ATM variables.28 However, our empirical focus
is more on testing whether there was a shift in the relationship between prices and ATM density
following surcharging than on obtaining accurate point estimates of our coeﬃcients. In other work
where we focus more on the latter concern, we implement a statistical correction for measurement
error and undertake a variety of robustness checks of the technique.29
A further econometric concern with our speci￿cations above is endogeneity. We would expect
that a bank￿s ATM density and deposit fees might be determined jointly as part of a bank￿s overall
business strategy, or both aﬀected by unobservable variables. Branch density and our other bank-
level characteristics might also be endogenous for similar reasons. If banks set fees strategically,
we might also expect competitors￿ surcharging to be related to a bank￿s ATM density or deposit
fees. It is diﬃcult to think of an appropriate (and large enough) set of instruments, although in
other work we use higher moments of the observable variables as instruments with some success.30
For the purposes of this paper, we view the joint changes in the observable variables as occurring
because of the surcharge ban removal; this was a relatively exogenous event from the perspective
of individual banks.
We also might expect that the coeﬃcient on competitors￿ ATMs would be biased negatively
by the fact that competitors￿ ATMs increase both willingness to pay for own deposit accounts and
willingness to pay for competitors￿ accounts. Thus, they may increase total willingness to pay for
a given bank, but shift its residual demand curve inward because it increases willingness to pay for
i t sc o m p e t i t o r s ￿a c c o u n t sb ym o r e .F o rt h i sr e a s o n ,w ev i e wt h ec o e ﬃcients on competitors￿ ATMs
as probably biased downward.
28See Fuller (1987) for a discussion of the problem and some solutions.
29See Knittel and Stango (2004) for details.
30See Knittel and Stango (2004).
144.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 present descriptive statistics for our sample. Appendix A outlines de￿nition and measure-
ment issues for these variables. We take our data from a variety of sources. The ATM-related
characteristics come from the Card Industry Directory, an annual trade publication listing data on
ATM ￿eets and fees for the largest three hundred ATM issuers. Many of those issuers are holding
companies consisting of multiple banks; this gives us data for roughly 3700 bank/years over the
sample period 1994-1999.
In most cases we report median values for our data, because the data are highly skewed. One
source of skewness is bank size; for example, while the median bank size (in deposits) is $326
million, the mean is $2.3 billion. The tenth and ninetieth percentiles are $58 million and $5.8
billion. Another source of skewness is geographic diversity, realized largely through diﬀerences in
branches and ATMs per square mile. The only variables for which we report means are those that
are not skewed: deposit fees, ATM fees and our analogous measures for competitors, salary per
employee and employees per branch.
The top rows show data by year regarding branches, ATMs, fees and the other variables included
in the hedonic speci￿cation. Branches remain roughly constant, but ATMs (and competitors￿
ATMs) grow signi￿cantly over the sample period. The average level of deposit fees remains constant,
although this is a bit misleading; we show below that among banks whose ATM ￿eets grew rapidly,
prices rose as well. Foreign fees remain roughly constant, while surcharges become quite prevalent
between 1997 and 1999, which nearly doubles a customer￿s expected costs for using a foreign ATM.
Salary per employee and employees per branch remain essentially constant. The number of counties
the typical bank operates in grows over time, re￿ecting the cross-market consolidation that occurred
in banking markets after their deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s.
5 Baseline Results
Table 2 presents the results of our hedonic regressions examining the relationship between incom-
patibility, bank/ATM characteristics and pricing. We show results from ￿ve speci￿cations, one that
omits incompatibility and four that include diﬀerent measures of incompatibility. The results are
quite robust to the measure of incompatibility.
The results show strong support for the existence of indirect network eﬀects, both between
deposit accounts and own ATMs, and also between deposit accounts and the complementary com-
petitors￿ ATMs available in the local market. We ￿nd that own ATMs and competitors￿ ATMs
are positively associated with deposit account prices. While in some cases the coeﬃcient on com-
petitors￿ ATMs is larger than that on own ATMs, this does not imply that competitors￿ ATMs are
15more strongly linked to prices than own ATMs. The ATM variables are in logs and the mean of
competitors￿ ATMs is signi￿cantly higher than that for own ATMs, meaning that an increase of
one ATM leads to a much smaller change in ln(competitors￿ ATMs) than in ln(ATMs).I ne v e r y
speci￿cation, adding one own ATM has a larger eﬀect on price than adding one competitors￿ ATM.
The magnitude of the results suggests that doubling the total number of ATMs available in the
local market is associated with deposit account prices roughly 5-10 percent higher. While this is
not an enormous eﬀect in economic terms, it is perhaps best interpreted as a lower bound given
the measurement error inherent in our measure of competitors￿ ATMs. And, for some banks we
observe increases of 300 percent in ATM density over the sample period.
We also ￿nd signi￿cant evidence that incompatibility changes the relative importance of own
and competitors￿ ATMs. The next three models include the density/incompatibility interaction
terms. In each case, the results suggest that incompatibility strengthens the relationship between
own ATMs and deposit account prices, and weakens the relationship between competitors￿ ATMs
and account prices. The results are robust to the incompatibility measure; furthermore, the pre-
1996 incompatibility coeﬃcients have similar signs, although they are not statistically signi￿cant.
This provides weak evidence against the hypothesis that some other regime change occurred in
1996 that changed the relative importance of own and competitors￿ ATMs.
The sizes of the coeﬃcients on the incompatibility measures suggests that at an expected com-
petitors￿ surcharge of $0.60, competitors￿ ATMs essentially have no relationship with deposit ac-
count prices. While the sum of the coeﬃcients does not change much after 1996 because the shifts
in own and competitors￿ coeﬃcients nearly oﬀset each other, the relative importance of ATMs in-
creases after 1996. Adding one own and one competitors￿ ATM to the market after 1996 aﬀects
prices more strongly, because more ￿weight￿ is on the component that is changing by more in
percentage terms.
W h i l ew ed on o td i s c u s st h e mi nd e t a i l ,t h eo t h e rc o e ﬃcients show an intuitive relationship
between bank characteristics and prices.31 In most speci￿cations branch density, salary per em-
ployee and employees per branch are positively related to prices, although only the coeﬃcients
on employees per branch are statistically signi￿cant. The results suggest that there is essentially
no systematic relationship between geographic breadth (as measured by number of counties) and
prices. Referring to the results in Appendix B, we also ￿nd a positive relationship between price
and whether the bank is a member of a bank holding company, operates in multiple counties, and
oﬀers brokerage services.
31Note that the bank-level ￿xed eﬀects capture bank characteristics that do not vary over time.
166 Alternative Speci￿cations
6.1 More Flexible Speci￿cations
While the hedonic speci￿cation above is informative, it is risky to interpret the coeﬃcients as
purely re￿ecting consumer tastes.32 Pakes (2003) notes that generally we should view a hedonic
relationship between prices and product characteristics as a reduced form speci￿cation of a richer
model in which ￿the hedonic function is the expectation of marginal costs plus that of the markup
conditional on ￿own-product￿ characteristics.￿ Feenstra (1995) goes beyond this general point to
explicitly model the exact relationship between prices, costs, markups and characteristics for par-
ticular functional forms of costs and utility. He notes that if ￿rms have log-linear marginal costs,
we can represent the relationship between prices and product characteristics (with slight changes
in notation) as:
ln(pit)=Xitβ + γ1 ln(OwnDensit)+γ2 ln(CompDensit)
+γ3 ln(OwnDensit)Incompatit + γ4 ln(CompDensit)Incompatit
+(lnpit − lncit)+αi + αt + εit. (7)
where the α terms capture shifts in marginal cost, and for simplicity we include in the X vector
both deposit account characteristics and the ATM- and incompatibility-related variables. The term
(lnpit − lncit) represents the markup of price over marginal cost. If this markup is non-zero and
correlated with any variables in X,t h eβ coeﬃcients will be biased.
In our case, we certainly expect markups over marginal cost to be positive, as pricing for deposit
accounts takes the form of a two-part tariﬀ and we are essentially measuring average prices. There
is also considerable evidence that banks possess short-run market power (leaving aside the question
of whether they earn supercompetitive returns in either the short or long run). The concern in
our case is that markups are correlated either with incompatibility, or with other variables in X.
As i m p l es p e c i ￿cation capturing this possibility is one that models the unobserved markup as a
function of incompatibility, i.e.:
lnpit − lncit = δ1 + δ2Incompatit
In this speci￿cation, markups are composed of a constant term and a term that varies with
incompatibility, suggesting the following speci￿cation:
32References making this point include Triplett (1986, 1988).
17ln(pit)=Xitβ + γ1 ln(OwnDensit)+γ2 ln(CompDensit)
+γ3 ln(OwnDensit)Incompatit + γ4 ln(CompDensit)Incompatit
+δ1 + δ2Incompatit + αi + αt + εit. (8)
In this case the constant markup δ1 is absorbed into the constant term (or ￿xed eﬀects), while
the coeﬃcient δ2 measures the eﬀect of incompatibility on markups.
More broadly, Pakes (2003) notes that markups conditional on product characteristics may
be a complex function of product characteristics as well as factors aﬀecting the equilibrium point
elasticity of demand, such as factors shifting costs and residual demand.33 Given our data, we
are unable to separate the eﬀects of ATM-related variables on willingness to pay from their eﬀect
on markups. However, we can employ a richer speci￿cation including cost- and demand-related
variables, in an attempt to mitigate any bias introduced by correlation between these factors and
our variables of interest. We therefore construct the following speci￿cation:
ln(pit)=Xitβ + γ1 ln(OwnDensit)+γ2 ln(CompDensit)
+γ3 ln(OwnDensit)Incompatit + γ4 ln(CompDensit)Incompatit
+δ1 + δ2Incompatit + Zitλ + αi + αt + εit. (9)
We include three variables in Zit: the ratio of noninterest expenses to assets for the bank, its
net interest margin on all of its loans, and the average savings rate on its deposits.34 Each of these
variables are measured in percentage points.35 While the noninterest expense ratio may include
both ￿xed and variable costs, it may be correlated with marginal cost. The interpretations of the
net interest margin and savings rate are less clear, as they likely measure components of both costs
and willingness to pay. The savings rate, for example, represents both an opportunity cost of funds
for the bank (aﬀecting its costs) and for consumers (aﬀecting their substitution between checking
and savings accounts). The net interest margin operates similarly. Thus, we remain agnostic about
33Pakes (2003) also notes that markups may depend on competitors￿ product characteristics. In unreported speci-
￿cations, we include a variety of such characteristics (such as the fraction of competitors oﬀering credit cards, money
market funds and brokerage services). None are statistically signi￿cant.
34We obtain these variables from the Call Reports. All variables are annualized. Noninterest expenses are yearly
expenses divided by total assets. The net interest margin is aggregate loan income minus aggregate loan losses divided
by total loan balances, all measured in dollars. The savings rate is total interest expense on savings accounts divided
by total savings balances, all measured in dollars.
35The sample means for the noninterest expense ratio, the net interest margin and the savings rate are 1.63%,
1.21% and 2.58% respectively.
18the expected signs of these coeﬃcients. To explore the possibility that incompatibility aﬀected the
in￿uence of these variables on markups, we also estimate a speci￿cation that interacts them with
incompatibility:
ln(pit)=Xitβ + γ1 ln(OwnDensit)+γ2 ln(CompDensit)
+γ3 ln(OwnDensit)Incompatit + γ4 ln(CompDensit)Incompatit
+δ1 + δ2Incompatit + Zitλ + ZitIncompatitπ + αi + αt + εit. (10)
Table 3 presents results from these three speci￿cations. All speci￿cations use the expected level
of competitors￿ surcharges as a measure of incompatibility. The most salient aspect of the results
is that in all three speci￿cation, the inclusion of the richer set of controls leaves our qualitative
results regarding indirect network eﬀects and incompatibility unchanged. In every speci￿cation
the signs of the coeﬃcients are identical to those in the earlier results, although those on own
and competitors￿ ATMs are estimated less precisely. The incompatibility terms remain statistically
signi￿cant, however. This provides further evidence that our empirical results accurately re￿ect
the existence of indirect network eﬀects and the eﬀect of incompatibility.
The coeﬃcient on the level of incompatibility varies in magnitude, but is positive and highly
signi￿cant in every speci￿cation. To the extent that this measures the eﬀect of incompatibility
on markups, the results suggest a relaxing of competition. One interpretation of this result is
that incompatibility relaxes price competition by strengthening horizontal and vertical product
diﬀerentiation. Without ATM fees of any sort, ATM ￿eet size is not a source of horizontal or
vertical product diﬀerentiation. As fees rise, consumers living or working near a bank￿s ATMs
will ￿nd that bank￿s deposit account more attractive because it allows them to avoid surcharges;
this increases horizontal diﬀerentiation. Furthermore, as incompatibility increases banks with large
ATM ￿eets become relatively more attractive to all customers who use ATMs.36
The cost/demand variables are statistically and economically signi￿cant, although the terms
interacting them with incompatibility are not (with the exception of that on the savings rate). The
noninterest expense ratio is positively related to prices, as expected. An increase in the ratio of
one standard deviation (within-￿rm) is associated with a price approximately 10% higher. The net
interest margin is positively related to prices. This is a bit puzzling, as it seems inconsistent with a
cost-based explanation if loan rates re￿ect the marginal return on dollars held in deposit accounts,
and inconsistent with a demand side explanation, as higher loan rates make complementary deposit
36Note that this shift is relative. Strictly speaking, incompatibility reduces willingness to pay for all banks￿ deposit
accounts by making ￿mix and match￿ transactions more costly. However, the reduction in willingness to pay is much
smaller for banks with large ATM ￿eets, because their customers are less likely to require access to a foreign ATM.
19accounts less attractive to consumers. It may be correlated with an unobserved cost shifter that
which would make both loan rates and deposit account prices higher. Finally, the savings rate is
positive and statistically signi￿cant. A one standard deviation increase in the savings rate is asso-
ciated with a three percent increase in deposit account prices. This may re￿ect a complementarity
in demand across savings and checking accounts, or could re￿ect the fact that higher savings rates
increase banks￿ cost of funds.
In concert, these results suggest that our baseline speci￿cations accurately re￿ect the impact of
network eﬀects and incompatibility. While it is diﬃcult to place too much weight on any particular
interpretation of the results for the new variables, it is encouraging that the baseline results are
stable to their inclusion. This is particularly true for the last speci￿cation, which includes both the
level of incompatibility and a full set of incompatibility interactions. While we do not interpret the
coeﬃcients as representing the primitives of the utility function, it seems unlikely that our main
results are simply driven by spurious correlation between our variables of interest and some other
factor.
6.2 Capturing the Demand for ￿Mix and Match￿ Transactions
The speci￿cations above pool the data, eﬀectively assuming that the hedonic relationship is identical
across the range of markets and ￿rms for which we observe data. Within the context of classic
hedonic modeling, it assumes that the value that consumers attach to mix and match transactions is
constant across markets (assuming that our coeﬃcients re￿ect this marginal value). Most models of
ATM usage view consumers￿ valuation of ATM access as dependent on the travel costs they face.37
This implies that the network eﬀects associated with ATMs and the eﬀects of incompatibility should
depend on travel costs. In order to explore this possibility, we stratify our sample by the population
density of banks￿ local markets, under the assumption that population density is correlated with
travel costs.
Table 4 presents summary data for our sample strati￿ed in two ways. First, we separate
banks into those operating in areas of high population density from those operating in areas of
low population density. We also separate large and small banks, based on local ATM share. We
categorize as ￿high density￿ any bank operating in areas with an average population density above
the sample median, and the remainder as operating in ￿low density￿ areas.38 We further segment
these subsamples, treating as ￿large￿ any bank in the subsample with a share of the local ATM
market larger than the median (for that subsample).
37See, e.g., Massoud and Bernhardt (2002) and McAndrews (2001).
38The sample median population density is 201 per square mile (measured at the county level). This is a density
typical in a small urban area. Because our data cover only the largest three hundred ATM issuers, and these issuers
operate primarily in metropolitan areas, the sample of markets is disproportionately high-density.
20These data show a clear pattern, that is not only informative regarding the travel cost story
but also sheds light on variation in the data that identi￿es our earlier results. The greatest changes
following the advent of surcharging occurred by large banks in dense areas. The most dramatic
changes are in ATM density, which doubles for large high-density banks but is unchanged for smaller
high-density banks. This is associated with equally dramatic changes in prices. Large banks charge
signi￿cantly higher ATM fees. They also charge higher deposit fees. More importantly, this deposit
fee gap grows signi￿cantly after the advent of surcharging, from $0.60 in 1995 to $1.66 in 1999.
There is little evidence of such change in low density areas. While there are diﬀerences between
large and small banks, they are not nearly so dramatic. Nor do they change very much after the
advent of surcharging.
Table 5 presents results from our hedonic models for subsamples based on density. Models 1 and
2 present results for the high and low density subsamples for our baseline speci￿cation, and models
3 and 4 present analogous results for our fuller speci￿cation in the previous section. The diﬀerence
is striking. In the high-density subsamples, the relationship between ATMs and deposit prices is
extremely strong, while in the low-density subsamples the relationships are essentially nonexistent.
In the baseline speci￿cation, the strength of the indirect network eﬀect essentially doubles, as does
the eﬀect of incompatibility. This is consistent with a view that travel costs increase the network
eﬀects between deposit accounts and ATM access, and also increase the importance of compatibility
between accounts and competitors￿ ATMs.
While it seems sensible that the results should be stronger in high-density markets, it does
seem a bit surprising that the results are nonexistent in low-density markets. While one possibil-
ity is simply that travel costs are low enough to render ATMs (and by extension incompatibility)
irrelevant, another possibility is simply that our model is well-speci￿ed for high-density markets
and poorly speci￿ed for low-density markets. Our functional form may describe high-density mar-
kets more accurately, for example. Evidence in favor of this comes from the other coeﬃcients.
Branch density, for example, is positively and signi￿cantly related to prices in high-density mar-
kets but not in low-density markets; our priors tell us that branches would be relatively more
important in markets where consumers do not value ATMs (though this is only a conjecture).
Similarly, ln(number of counties) is positively related to prices in high-density markets￿a result
we ￿nd intuitive￿but negatively related to prices in low-density markets. This pattern seems to
suggest that speci￿cation error may be a problem in low-density markets. On the other hand,
the cost/demand variables are more strongly related to prices in low-density than in high-density
markets. Given this inconclusive evidence, we interpret our results as ￿nding strong evidence for
the existence of network eﬀects and an economically relevant relationship between incompatibil-
ity and pricing in high-density markets, while in low-density markets we are unsure whether our
21(non-)results re￿ect lower travel costs or speci￿cation error for these markets.
6.3 Alternative Measures of Price
Because our measure of prices is somewhat aggregate and rough, we explore the robustness of our
results to alternative measures of price; results of the baseline model using alternative measures
of price are shown in Table 6. One speci￿cation estimates the model using the level of prices
rather than the log. A second speci￿cation uses total accounts rather than total deposits in the
denominator, and a third uses the level of the account-based price rather than the log. Finally,
our ￿nal alternative speci￿cation uses the price measure de￿ned above, but also includes the share
of total deposits held in checking accounts and the level of deposits per account as right-hand
side variables. This controls for a number of issues. First, within-bank variation in the share
of deposits held in checking accounts would change measured prices, which would be a concern
if such variation were correlated with our right-hand side variables of interest. Second, within-
bank variation in deposits per account might aﬀect measured prices if banks waive deposit fees for
customers with high balances per account. Again, this would be a concern if such variation were
correlated with our variables of interest. However, as the results in Table 6 indicate our results are
quite robust to the price measure that we use.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We set out in this paper to test whether a hedonic model can uncover economically signi￿cant
indirect network eﬀects. We also test whether changes in the compatibility of components in a
network system aﬀect prices in a material way. For high-density, primarily urban markets, we ￿nd
strong evidence of these links between bank deposit accounts and ATMs. One novelty of our result
is that we ￿nd signi￿cant relationships between a bank￿s deposit accounts and the density of ATMs
deployed by its competitors in the local market. In the context of the network economics literature,
this represents a link between hardware pricing and the availability of competitors￿ software.
We also ￿nd that the incompatibility of these machines with deposit accounts￿as measured
by ATM surcharges￿is associated with deposit account price movements. This pattern of results
suggests that the interplay between compatibility and pricing is important, and that links between
pricing and quality for diﬀerent products linked by indirect network eﬀects can be quite strong.
This is particularly useful to know since some previous studies of network markets have examined
only one component.
22A Data Appendix: Sources and Variable Construction
A.1 Primary Data Sources
We take our data from four principal sources. The ￿rst is the Card Industry Directory, an annual
trade publication listing detailed data on ATM and debit card issuers. The Card Industry Directory
contains data for the largest 300 ATM card issuers, who collectively own roughly 80 percent of the
nation￿s ATM ￿eet during our sample period. These issuers are most often commercial banks,
although some are bank holding companies, credit unions or thrifts. The sample period covered in
our data set runs from 1994 to 2002. Data are measured on January 1 of each year.
We also take data from the FDIC Reports of Condition and Income, or Call Reports. The Call
Report data are collected quarterly by the FDIC for every commercial bank in the country. The
Call Reports contain detailed balance sheet and income data for each bank. They also indicate
which bank holding company owns the bank. Thus, if the Card Industry Directory contains a
listing regarding ATM issuance for a bank holding company, we can match that data with the
corresponding data for each bank owned by the holding company. The Call Reports do not contain
data for credit unions or thrifts; we drop them from the sample.
We supplement the above with data from the FDIC Summary of Deposits Database (SOD).
The SOD lists the location of branches for every bank and thrift in the country. It also lists the
deposits held at each branch. It does not contain data on branch location for credit unions. We
assume that each credit union has one branch, located in its home county, and that all of that
credit union￿s deposits are held at that branch. This assumption is unlikely to aﬀect our results.
SOD data are collected each June.
A.2 An Observation in Our Data
By cross-referencing the data sets above, we obtain observations at the issuer level describing each
issuer￿s balance sheet activity and ATM activity. We also use the geographic data from the SOD
to derive information about the market(s) in which the issuer competes. Because the data are
measured at diﬀerent times, we must establish a concordance between the dates in the diﬀerent
data sets. We establish the concordance based on the fact that our analysis includes deposit
prices as LHS variables, and ATM-related variables as RHS variables. While these may be jointly
determined, to mitigate the endogeneity problem we match ATM-related data for each January
with six-month ahead data from the other data sets. Thus an observation from 1994 contains
ATM-related data from January 1994, while all other data are from June 1994. We describe these
data below.
23A.2.1 Pricing for Accounts and ATMs
For each issuer, we observe its income associated with deposit accounts over the year preceding the
observation date. The primary component of such income is income from monthly service charges
on deposit accounts. It also includes foreign fee income paid by its customers stemming from the
use of other issuers￿ ATMs. It also includes a variety of other fees such as NSF fees for bounced
checks and other penalty fees on deposit accounts. If the issuer is a bank holding company, we sum
its deposit fee income for all banks in the holding company.
To develop our measure of prices, we divide income on deposit accounts by the end-of-year
dollar value of deposits (in thousands). This price measure therefore represents the average fees
paid per dollar of deposits. This measure omits the additional opportunity cost of holding deposits
in checking, which is the forgone savings interest income. However, it is likely that the measurement
error associated with omitting this component of ￿prices￿ is similar across banks, and within banks
over time.39
Another issue associated with using this price measure is that banks typically oﬀer consumers
account options with lower explicit fees in exchange for maintaining higher minimum balances. If
banks diﬀer systematically in the composition of their customer bases, we will understate fees at
banks with high deposits per customer (assuming those customers sort into accounts designed for
them).
A practical diﬃculty with using this measure of fees is that the numerator is a ￿ow measure
over the previous year, while the denominator is a stock measure at end-of-year. This creates
measurement error for banks with large deposit acquisitions or divestitures during the year. Indeed,
there are a signi￿cant number of observations with implausibly small or large fee measures. To
check that these were outliers stemming from measurement error, we measured the year-to-year
percentage change in deposits for observations with exceedingly small or high fee measures; we found
that in most cases such observations were for banks that experienced extremely large changes in
deposits (more than ￿fty percent in absolute value). We drop these observations. In unreported
speci￿cations we also include these observations but truncate the fee variable at ￿reasonable￿ values,
with little diﬀerence in the qualitative results.
For each issuer in the Card Industry Directory, we also observe its foreign ATM fee and surcharge
at the beginning of the year for the observation. In some cases, the bank lists a range for these
fees. In that case, we use the highest fee reported. In the empirical work, this tends to understate
the true relationship between fees and our other variables of interest.
39In Knittel and Stango (2004), we include a measure of the opportunity cost of funds in our price measure. Using
the broader measure has little eﬀect on the results in that paper.
24A.2.2 Branch- and ATM-Related Variables
For each issuer, we observe its total deposits, ATMs and branches. We also observe the distribution
of its deposits and branches across individual counties. Obtaining data on county size in square
miles allows us to calculate the density of branches/ATMs per square mile within each county.
For banks operating in multiple counties, we calculate the average number of branches and ATMs
across all counties in which the bank operates.
In order to construct competitors￿ ATMs, we estimate the total number of competitors￿ ATMs
in each county. We do this by estimating a within-sample regression of ATMs on branches, year
dummies and year/branch interaction terms. To control for the fact that larger FIs have a greater
ratio of ATMs to branches, we also interact the branch variables with the log of issuer size (in
deposits). We then construct ￿t t e dv a l u e so fA T M sf o re a c hF If o rw h i c hw ed on o th a v eA T M
data. In order to check the sensibility of this procedure, we compared the ￿tted total number of
ATMs from this procedure to aggregate data on ATM deployment. The ￿gures match fairly closely.
We also conduct in Knittel and Stango (2004) a wide variety of robustness checks, involving diﬀerent
methods of estimating competitors￿ ATMs.
A ￿nal point regarding the measurement of competitors￿ ATMs is that it omits ATMs deployed
by Independent Service Operators (ISOs). This introduces measurement error, and may bias our
measures of competitors￿ ATM density. This would be particularly important in urban markets
where ISO ATM deployment was quite rapid after 1996.
B Second-Stage Hedonics
A number of bank-level characteristics are ￿xed at the bank level over time. This precludes their
inclusion in the hedonic regressions, which also include bank ￿xed eﬀects. However, we can learn
something about the value of these other characteristics by examining their relationship to the ￿xed
eﬀects.
Starting with our estimates b αi of the bank ￿xed eﬀects, we construct the vector Πi of time-
invariant bank characteristics. The ￿rst set of such characteristics describes the product oﬀerings of
each bank; there are dummies equal to one if the bank oﬀers a credit card, money market accounts,
or brokerage services. We also include a dummy if the bank has branches in multiple counties, and
a dummy equal to one if the bank is part of a larger bank holding company. Some of these variables
(particularly the product oﬀering variables) vary over time for a small subset of banks. For these
banks we use the average value of the dummy variable over the sample period as the independent
variable.
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28C Tables and Figures
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
B r a n c h e s / b a n k 677787
Branches/square mile 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.008
ATMs/bank 7 8 10 11 14 14
ATMs/square mile 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.013 0.013
Competitors￿ ATMs/square mile 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.19 0.22
D e p o s i t f e e s ( $ p e r $ 1 0 0 0 o f d e p o s i t s ) 2 . 4 82 . 5 02 . 5 02 . 3 12 . 3 92 . 4 5
Foreign fee ($) 1.20 1.31 1.31 1.19 1.23 1.16
Surcharge ($) n/a n/a n/a 0.67 0.91 0.95
Expected competitors￿ surcharge ($) n/a n/a n/a 0.53 0.73 0.88
Salary per employee ($1000) 16 16 17 18 19 20
E m p l o y e e s p e r b r a n c h 1 71 61 61 61 61 5
Number of counties 4 4 5 7 9 11
Sources: Federal Reserve Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports), various
years; FDIC Summary of Deposits,v a r i o u sy e a r s ;Card Industry Directory,
various years.
Values are medians for ATM- and branch-related variables, means for all others.
29Table 2. Baseline Hedonic Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
ln(own ATM density) 0.037∗∗ 0.011 0.032∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.029∗∗
(0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
ln(own ATM density) 0.019∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
x Incompatibility (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
ln(own ATM density) 0.016
x pre-1996 Incompatibility (0.014)
ln(competitors￿ ATM density) 0.010 0.065∗∗∗ 0.025∗ 0.020 0.020
(0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
ln(competitors￿ ATM density) −0.034∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗
x Incompatibility (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
ln(competitors￿ ATM density) -0.019
x allow surcharges pre-1996 (0.024)
ln(own branch density) 0.016 0.016 0.025 0.017 0.018
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
ln(salary per employee) 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005)
ln(employees per branch) 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ (0.0003)∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
ln(number of counties) -0.007 -0.009 -0.005 -0.010 -0.011
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Constant 1.09∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.071)
Number of Observations 3686
∗ -s i g n i ￿cant at 10 percent or better
∗∗ -s i g n i ￿cant at ￿ve percent or better
∗∗∗ -s i g n i ￿cant at one percent or better
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Deposit Fees).
All speci￿cations include ￿xed year and bank eﬀects.
Model 2 uses foreign ATM cost to measure incompatibility.
Model 3 uses competitors￿ surcharges to measure incompatibility.
Model 4 uses post-1996 dummy variable to measure incompatibility.
Model 5 adds dummy variable for states permitting surcharging before 1996.
30Table 3. Hedonics with Supply/Demand Regressors Added
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ln(own ATM density) 0.029∗∗ 0.006 0.010
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
ln(own ATM density) x Incompatibility 0.021∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.014∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
ln(competitors￿ ATM density) 0.017 0.014 0.013
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
ln(competitors￿ ATM density) x Incompatibility -0.047∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
ln(own branch density) 0.014 0.033 0.033
(0.020) (0.025) (0.025)
ln(salary per employee) 0.0007 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(employees per branch) 0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0005 -0.0005
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0004)
ln(number of counties) -0.008 0.004 0.004
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
Constant 1.07∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.098) (0.099)
Incompatibility 0.419∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗ 0.252∗∗
(0.101) (0.112) (0.112)
Non-interest expense ratio 0.216∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.019)
Net interest margin 0.023∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Savings rate 0.062∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.002)
Non-interest expenses x post-1996 0.001
(0.002)
Net interest margin x post-1996 0.001
(0.001)
Savings rate x post-1996 -0.092∗∗∗
(0.026)
Number of Observations 3686 3686 3686
∗ -s i g n i ￿cant at 10 percent or better
∗∗ -s i g n i ￿cant at ￿ve percent or better
∗∗∗ -s i g n i ￿cant at one percent or better
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Deposit Fees).
All speci￿cations include ￿xed year and bank eﬀects.
Model uses competitors￿ surcharges to measure incompatibility.
31Table 4. Summary Statistics by ATM Share and Population Density
Variable 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Branches/ large bank, high density 0.037 0.036 0.038 0.042 0.035 0.039
square mile: small bank, high density 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.012
large bank, low density 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.012
small bank, low density 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.005
ATMs/ large bank, high density 0.043 0.047 0.054 0.066 0.084 0.091
square mile: small bank, high density 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.012 0.014 0.013
large bank, low density 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.012
small bank, low density 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004
Deposit fees: large bank, high density 2.87 2.89 2.89 3.01 3.29 3.29
small bank, high density 2.37 2.32 2.15 2.06 1.91 1.82
large bank, low density 2.46 2.72 2.87 2.92 2.54 2.73
small bank, low density 2.51 2.40 2.40 2.42 2.28 2.43
Surcharge: large bank, high density n/a n/a n/a 0.82 1.11 1.18
small bank, high density n/a n/a n/a 0.47 0.95 0.91
large bank, low density n/a n/a n/a 0.92 1.27 1.25
small bank, low density n/a n/a n/a 0.84 1.10 1.05
Foreign fee: large bank, high density 1.33 1.37 1.43 1.35 1.37 1.29
small bank, high density 1.12 1.23 1.20 1.04 1.08 1.01
large bank, low density 1.31 1.45 1.51 1.32 1.48 1.40
small bank, low density 1.19 1.36 1.28 1.18 1.24 1.16
Notes: High and low density are above and below sample median.
Large/small banks are those above/below median deposit market share for density subsample.
32Table 5. Hedonics in High and Low Population Density Markets
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ln(own ATM density) 0.046∗∗∗ 0.016 0.029 -0.002
(0.017) (0.027) (0.019) (0.029)
ln(own ATM density) 0.046∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ -0.006
x Incompatibility (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
ln(competitors￿ ATM density) 0.044∗∗ -0.020 0.015 -0.018
(0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
ln(competitors￿ ATM density) -0.037∗∗∗ −0.010 -0.054∗∗∗ 0.007
x Incompatibility (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013)
ln(own branch density) 0.080∗∗∗ 0.014 0.132∗∗∗ -0.011
(0.027) (0.033) (0.034) (0.039)
ln(salary per employee) 0.0002 0.032∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.0005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
ln(employees per branch) 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0006 0.0002 -0.004∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.001)
ln(number of counties) 0.034∗∗ -0.043∗∗ 0.041∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022)
Constant 1.36∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.939∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.09) (0.122) (0.140) (0.150)
Incompatibility 0.690∗∗∗ -0.042
(0.186) (0.165)
Non-interest expense ratio 0.155∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.032)
Net interest margin -0.002 0.042∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
Savings rate 0.090∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.002)
Non-interest expenses x post-1996 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Net interest margin x post-1996 0.031∗∗ -0.022
(0.014) (0.015)
Savings rate x post-1996 -0.058 -0.108∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.034)
Number of Observations 1843 1843 1843 1843
∗ -s i g n i ￿cant at 10 percent or better
∗∗ -s i g n i ￿cant at ￿ve percent or better
∗∗∗ -s i g n i ￿cant at one percent or better
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Deposit Fees).
All speci￿cations include ￿xed year and bank eﬀects.
Model uses competitors￿ surcharges to measure incompatibility.
Models (1) and (3) use observations from high-density markets.
Models (2) and (4) use observations from low-density markets.
33Table 6. Alternative Price Measures
Baseline Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ln(own ATM density) 0.046∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.042) (0.017) (0.042)
ln(own ATM density) 0.046∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗
x Incompatibility (0.009) (0.009) (0.022) (0.009) (0.022)
ln(competitors￿ ATM density) 0.044∗∗ 0.031 0.063 0.044∗∗ 0.063
(0.020) (0.020) (0.049) (0.020) (0.049)
ln(competitors￿ ATM density) -0.037∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗
x Incompatibility (0.011) (0.011) (0.027) (0.011) (0.026)
Baseline uses speci￿cation from column 1, Table 5.
Model 1 includes deposits per account and % of total deposits in checking accounts on RHS.
Model 2 uses level (not log) of deposit fees as price.
Model 3 uses ln(fee income per account) as price.
Model 4 uses level of fee income per account as price.
34Table B1. Second stage hedonics with time-invariant characteristics.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Multi-county bank dummy 0.123∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.092∗∗
(0.038) (0.067) (0.042)
Oﬀers credit card -0.041 0.001 -0.099∗
(0.052) (0.089) (0.057)
Oﬀers money market -0.029 -0.267 0.365
(0.256) (0.284) (0.535)
Oﬀers brokerage services 0.071∗ 0.165∗∗ 0.049
(0.040) (0.067) (0.045)
Part of BHC 0.452∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗ 0.046
(0.093) (0.105) (0.101)
constant -0.471∗ -0.433 -0.317
(0.269) (0.306) (0.541)
N 1276 638 638
R2 0.04 0.06 0.02
Speci￿cations use ￿rst-stage results from model (3) of Table 2.
Model 1 uses entire sample.
Model 2 uses observations from high-density markets.
Model 3 uses observations from low-density markets.
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